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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Revenue Management in 
Restaurants:
A 
substantial minority of  restaurant guests would be willing to pay separately for a restaurant 
reservation, while a much larger group is not supportive of  this approach, according to an 
online survey of  297 U.S. residents. Those respondents who are most likely to accept the idea 
of  paying for a reservation represent customers who are also relatively familiar with this 
practice. The survey respondents were reacting to three possible scenarios for unbundling the value of  the 
reservation from that of  the meal itself. Based in part on actual industry practice, the three scenarios are 
(1) a reservations company charges for a reservation but does not share the proceeds with the restaurant; 
(2) a reservations company charges for a reservation and shares the revenue with the restaurant; and (3) the 
restaurant charges a reservation fee without involving a third party. For revenue management purposes, 
familiarity with the unbundling practice is related to guest acceptance of  that practice. Since numerous 
companies now sell prime restaurant reservations as a separate product, it seems likely that over time the 
guests’ familiarity with paying for at least some reservations will grow, along with their acceptance of  the 
practice. 
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Unbundling Pricing for Reservations 
from the Core Service
CORNELL HOSPITALITY REPORT
by Sheryl Kimes and Jochen Wirtz
Although restaurants have long varied their price structure under certain circumstances, those price changes generally have involved specific promotions, set menus, or minimum-check requirements. Many restaurant businesses use time of  day pricing, such as happy hours or early bird discounts, but these do not necessarily respond to daily (or hourly) 
demand.1 More to the point, restaurants generally do not explicitly charge for table capacity, although they 
do not know how much revenue a particular cover will bring in. This stands in contrast to such businesses as 
Uber and Lyft, which have demonstrated that customers are willing to pay different prices for some services 
based on demand and timing.2 It’s also a contrast to airlines and hotels, which include the value of  the 
reservation as part of  a stated price at the time of  booking. Given the popularity of  early (or late) dining 
promotions, it should not be a surprise that our previous research has shown that consumers find variable 
pricing practices in the restaurant industry acceptable in certain circumstances, particularly when framed as 
discounts.3 Less common is the practice of  explicitly charging for table capacity. In this article, we explore 
ways that restaurants might separate the pricing for the table itself  (at a particular time) and the meal 
consumed.
1 For an analysis of  variable restaurant pricing, see: Sheryl E. Kimes, Robert Phillips, and Lisabet Summa (2012), “Pricing in Restaurants,” in Oxford 
Handbook of  Pricing, ed. Ozalp Ozer and Robert Phillips (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press); and Gary M. Thompson (2015), “Deciding Whether to Offer 
“Early-Bird” or “Night-Owl” Specials in Restaurants:  A Cross-Functional View,” Journal of  Service Research, 18 (4): 498-512.
2 Jochen Wirtz and Christopher Tang (2016, forthcoming), “Uber: Competing as Marketing Leader in the U.S. vs. Being a Distant Second in China,” in: 
Jochen Wirtz and Christopher Lovelock, Services Marketing: People, Technology, Strategy. 8th ed., Singapore: World Scientific.
3 Sheryl E. Kimes and Jochen Wirtz. (2003). “When Does Revenue Management Become Acceptable?,” Journal of  Service Research. 7 (2): 125-135; and 
Jochen Wirtz and Sheryl E. Kimes. (2007). “The Moderating Role of  Familiarity in Fairness Perceptions of  Revenue Management,” Journal of  Service Research.  
9 (3): 229–240.
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The fact that customers are accustomed to purchasing 
an experience consisting of  both the meal and the time of  the 
reservation presents a key challenge in applying revenue man-
agement (RM) to restaurants. 4 In general, U.S. restaurants at-
tempt to recoup the cost of  the table time with the sale of  food, 
rather than charging separately for those two products. While 
restaurants in some countries do have a separate cover charge, 
that amount is often nominal and rarely varies by time of  day. 
We suggest that by charging a separate price for the reservation, 
restaurants would essentially be unbundling their two service 
offerings into the reservation time and the core service of  food 
and beverage. That change would reflect the fact that the value 
of  the reservation varies over time. Unbundling the reservation 
from the core service allows more effective pricing of  capacity, 
since the restaurant doesn’t really know in advance whether the 
guests’ meal spending will actually cover the implicit cost of  the 
time that they occupy the table. 
By contrast, hotels, airlines, and sporting and entertain-
ment venues price their product based on their reasonable 
expectation of  how much customers will spend at the time of  
the reservation. For these industries, bundling the reservation 
with the core service makes it easier to apply RM since the total 
price for the service bundle is largely fixed when the reservation 
is made, and bundling allows them the ability to vary the price 
based on demand. Moreover, these businesses can reasonably 
count on their guests to purchase additional, ancillary services, 
although those amounts are small relative to the cost of  using 
the service itself  (e.g., paying for checked bags or purchasing 
food on site).  
Unbundling the price of  the reservation from the core 
service seems an interesting approach to RM in any industry 
where the total revenue at the time of  the reservation is highly 
uncertain. Companies are using this unbundling approach in 
some locations, as in the case of  Singapore’s taxis. Most taxi 
companies base their fares on the distance traveled, which 
means that, like restaurants, they cannot be certain how much 
they will earn from each fare. Moreover, in a distance-based 
fare system, mileage rates typically do not vary by demand level 
(even if  there is an additional tariff for time spent in traffic or 
time of  day, such as a nighttime fee). Because of  the structure of  
demand in Singapore, however, its taxi firms offer pre-booking 
for a fee of  S$8 (in addition to the fare). Customers who want 
certainty about when their taxi will arrive willingly pay this fee, 
4 Breffni M. Noone, Jochen Wirtz, and Sheryl E. Kimes (2012), “The 
Effect of  Perceived Control on Consumer Responses to Service Encounter 
Pace: A Revenue Management Perspective,” Cornell Hospitality Quarterly. 53 (4): 
295-307; Breffni M. Noone, Sheryl E. Kimes, Anna S. Mattila, and Jochen 
Wirtz (2009), “Perceived Service Encounter Pace and Customer Satisfaction: 
An Empirical Study of  Restaurant Experiences,” Journal of  Service Management. 
20 (4): 380-403. 59; Sheryl E. Kimes, Jochen Wirtz and Breffni M. Noone 
(2002), “How Long Should Dinner Take? Measuring Expected Meal Duration 
for Restaurant Revenue Management,” Journal of  Revenue and Pricing Manage-
ment. 1 (3): 220-233.
particularly those who might have an early flight or meeting. 
Charging this reservation fee effectively unbundles the booking 
from the core service of  transportation. It also ensures the avail-
ability of  a taxi for would-be passengers.
The Singapore taxi approach is still relatively uncommon 
in other locations or industries. It is therefore an interesting 
problem to explore how reservations can be unbundled and 
priced separately from the core service for restaurants, taxis, and 
industries with similar characteristics. Those firms include ca-
sino hotels, which can estimate (but not be certain of) the prob-
able net win from each guest and do not have an express cost of  
entry, and theme parks, which do have a set entry fee, but where 
guests’ additional purchases can be substantial (although not 
necessarily known until after the guests leave). Interestingly, in 
2016 the Walt Disney Company implemented revenue manage-
ment for its entry tickets when it announced plans to introduce 
variable pricing for its Walt Disney World theme parks, based 
on three levels of  anticipated attendance. This policy change is 
motivated in part by a desire to reduce overcrowding on popular 
days.5 
Revenue Management Applied to Restaurants
Restaurant reservations have traditionally been offered at no 
explicit cost in the U.S., but in reality, some reservations provide 
more value than others. For example, a reservation at a popular 
restaurant during prime time has more value than a reservation 
at a less popular restaurant at any time, especially an off time. 
Even with a popular restaurant, reservations during a prime 
time offer more value than those during off-peak times. 
Knowing that the room will fill up, restaurants often hold 
back prime time inventory so that they can control who gets 
those tables. By doing this, restaurants can ensure that their 
prime inventory is available to their highest value guests, such 
as regulars or VIPs. However, this approach is typically based 
on history and experience, rather than an analysis of  expected 
arrivals and spending. As a result, managers may hold back too 
much inventory, and end up with empty tables during a peak 
time. On the other hand, if  the restaurant seats walk-ins who 
spend less than the restaurant’s VIP guests or if  insufficient 
walk-ins materialize, a restaurant may end up reducing a po-
tentially great night into just average performance by declining 
potentially lucrative reservations.
Aside from regular customers whose orders are fairly pre-
dictable, restaurant operators generally do not know how much 
their potential guests will spend when accepting a reservation. 
Restaurants can take one of  three approaches to address this is-
sue: (1) they can pair their reservations data with their point-of-
5 Sandra Pedicini, “Disney to Set Seasonal Prices,” Orlando Sentinel, 
February 27, 2016 (www.orlandosentinel.com/business/tourism/os-disney-
demand-pricing-20160226-story.html; and Brad Tuttle, “What Disney’s Big 
Theme Park Price Changes Are Really All About,” Money, October 5, 2015 
(time.com/money/4061526/disney-price-changes-increase/).
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sale (POS) data so that they have a better understanding of  how 
much potential customers are likely to spend; (2) they can offer 
tickets for prix fixe meals, thereby guaranteeing at least a base for 
guest spending, similar to Nick Kokonas at Next and Tock; or 
(3) they can explicitly charge a fee for their prime-time reserva-
tions. Approach 1 has the disadvantage that restaurants may not 
know the guests well enough to predict the check per person, 
and new guests would not be in the database even though they 
could potentially be high value parties. Because approach 2 of-
fers limited choice to guests (and sometimes no choice), it would 
restrict the customers who are willing to book a seat. Moreover, 
the limitations may end up damaging guest satisfaction. Thus, 
we see approach 3, pricing the reservation separately from the 
core service, as conceptually the cleanest solution to this issue. 
The restaurant is guaranteed a certain amount of  revenue per 
seat, and we anticipate that only higher value guests will be will-
ing to pay a reservation fee. Moreover, guests will still be paying 
for the meal. Much of  this is supposition, however, since charg-
ing for reservations is not a common practice, and restaurants 
may be reluctant to do so because they fear negative customer 
responses due to potential perceptions of  unfairness and price 
gouging.
In this report we begin unraveling this issue by examining 
the extent of  consumer acceptance of  charging for hard-to-
get reservations at popular restaurants. We begin with a brief  
overview of  the existing practice of  restaurants or third parties 
charging a fee for reservations, and then present the theoretical 
background of  our research approach followed by our findings 
and implications. 
Overview of  Fees for Reservation Services
Guests at many restaurants probably already believe that they 
pay expressly for a restaurant reservation when they tip the 
captain for a table. For many years, customers have been able 
to obtain hard-to-get tables at desirable restaurants by tipping 
the maître d’, and this is still the case in some restaurants. The 
exact date of  when this practice started is unclear, but tipping 
the maître d’ in the U.S. was common practice in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and it is depicted in movies from earlier decades.6 
An amusing article in Gourmet magazine from a few years 
ago recounts the author’s experiment in seeing how much he 
needed to tip the maître d’ to get into popular New York City 
restaurants without a reservation.7 Although this practice does 
not expressly increase a restaurant’s revenue or cover the value 
of  a reservation to the restaurant, owners might accept it since 
customers who are willing to pay a premium to get a table are 
presumably likely to spend more in the restaurant. Restaurant 
6 David Rubinstein. (1988). Autobiographical Memory. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, p. 129.
7 Bruce Feiler. (2000). “Pocketful of  Dough,” Gourmet. October 2000. 
web.archive.org/web/20010907175756/http://www.epicurious.com/g_gour-
met/g06_feature/james_beard/dough.html. Accessed 7/6/15.
owners might also favor this practice because the captain’s ad-
ditional income should reduce turnover, and a good maître d’ is 
valuable to a restaurant.
The idea of  separating reservations from the meal itself  
is not totally alien to today’s diners. A number of  companies 
have sprung up that help customers get reservations at 
popular restaurants for a fee. The idea of  using the internet 
to charge for reservations emerged in January 2005,8 when 
withoutreservations.biz started offering $40 reservations for 
some 75 popular upscale restaurants in New York City, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco. The way this operated is that 
owners of  the company used fictitious names to make one 
reservation per restaurant (for which they did not have to pay). 
They then sold those reservations to their customers. While 
some restaurateurs complained that this was scalping, neither 
New York nor California law considered it to be scalping, since 
the business was not selling purchased event tickets, but was 
instead selling a free service.9 
Also in 2005, Pascal Riffaud, the former concierge of  the 
Ritz in Paris and the St. Regis in New York City, purchased 
PrimeTime Tables from an entrepreneur who had aimed her 
business at hotel concierges. PrimeTime Tables used a member-
ship model in which members paid an annual fee in exchange 
for access to $35 reservations at popular restaurants. Riffaud 
used the connections he had developed in his many years as 
a concierge to get the reservations. He would make only one 
reservation per restaurant, and in the event that the reservation 
was not sold, he would call the restaurant to cancel.
Criticism was quite harsh, and the issue of  scalping again 
arose. Eater.com, a U.S.-based food blog, railed: “This site is no 
more legitimate than the ticket scalpers who cruise outside Yan-
kee Stadium during the playoff.”10 Riffaud responded: “At the 
best restaurants, more than half  of  the prime weekend tables 
are unavailable to the ordinary diner before the reservations 
books open. Tables are set aside for the chef, the maître d’hôtel, 
and friends of  the house.”11 In essence, he argued that he was 
not selling reservations, but was instead receiving payment for a 
service, much akin to a tip to a concierge.12
These services essentially replaced the tip given to the 
maître d’, and redirected the additional revenue to the outside 
company. Several similar services emerged, including TableX-
change and Celebrity Tables, but the 2008-09 recession crushed 
these and most of  the other pay-for-reservations companies. 
8 Mclaughlin, op. cit.
9 Ibid.
10 Leventhal, Ben. (2007). “PrimeTime Tables: WTF?” eater.com. 
1/18/07. Viewed 7/6/15. ny.eater.com/2007/1/18/6819777/primetimeta-
bles-wtf
11 Heilemann, op.cit.
12 Ibid.
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(2) Reservation company shares fees with the 
restaurant. Like the firms in category one, these companies 
make fictitious reservations. However, they not only share the 
reservation fee with the restaurant, but they attempt to provide 
the restaurant with additional value. For example, Reserve 
charges $5 per reservation, and provides the restaurant with cus-
tomer information and a seamless payment experience. Table8 
collaborates with Concur, a business travel company, and inte-
grates the restaurant reservation into the entire business traveler 
experience. With this model, the restaurant has the choice of  
making inventory available to the reservation company, can vary 
the price for a reservation by demand level, and can even offer 
free reservations during slow times.16
Gary Vaynerchuk, the co-founder of  Resy, a company that 
shares revenue with restaurants, asserts that Resy has “democra-
tized” hard-to-get reservations. “People who were complaining 
that this was elitist—they weren’t getting the tables in the first 
place! There was the misnomer that these tables were available. 
They weren’t available to anyone but VIPs.”17
(3) Ticketing. This approach, which is taken by restau-
rants such as Next and Alinea in Chicago, can eliminate third 
parties. The restaurant offers a set menu that is sold at varying 
prices. As occurs with other revenue management strategies, 
customers can see how the per-person price varies by day of  
week, time of  day, and table size. They can make their selec-
tion based on their preferred set of  criteria and then pay for 
their meal in advance by credit card. Recently, a third-party 
firm, Tock, has rolled out this approach to about 20 other 
restaurants.18 Note that this study does not examine customer 
response to ticketing, since it doesn’t expressly separate the 
reservation cost from that of  the meal.
(4) Restaurant charges and keeps all revenue. As 
we indicated above, this is conceptually the most elegant solu-
tion, since it allows the restaurant to retain all incremental rev-
enues obtained from the sale of  reservations and it makes clear 
the value of  the reservation to the guest. However, this approach 
is alien to the restaurant industry. To the best of  our knowledge, 
this has not yet been applied, given the concerns about negative 
customer reactions that we mentioned above.
16 Matt Buchanon (2014). “Can you Uber a Burger?” New York Times 
Magazine. 10/26. Viewed 7/6/15 (www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/maga-
zine/can-you-uber-a-burger.html); Jay Cheshes (2014), “Ticket to Dine: The 
Restaurant Reservation Revolution,” Wall Street Journal. 5/30/14. Accessed 
7/4/15 (www.wsj.com/articles/ticket-to-dine-the-restaurant-reservation-
revolution-1401463548).
17 Lagoria-Chafkin, op cit.
18 Cheshes, op. cit.
Even the most popular restaurants had plenty of  tables available 
in 2009, so there was no longer a market for this service.
Fast forward to 2014. The economy had picked up and 
these services re-emerged along with demand for restaurant 
tables. The approaches generally applied to paid reservations 
are: (1) Third party charges for a reservation and does not share 
with the restaurant; (2) Third party charges for a reservation 
and shares with the restaurant; and (3) Restaurant sells tickets 
for a set menu with prices varying by time, demand, or other 
criteria. We also see the possibility of: (4) Restaurant bypasses 
the middleman and directly charges for the reservation. Once 
again, we believe that restaurants are shying away from this 
practice for fear of  negative customer reactions. Let’s examine 
each of  these four approaches.
(1) Reservation company does not share fees with 
the restaurant. Given that restaurants have been reluctant to 
charge a premium during busy periods, a number of  services 
have arisen to fill that vacuum, by booking a table under a ficti-
tious name, selling the reservation, and pocketing the proceeds. 
Companies pursuing this approach include Shout and Killer 
Rezzy. Some of  these services, such as Today’s Epicure, charge 
an annual membership fee that entitles members to an unlimit-
ed number of  reservations. We infer that members would spend 
more than non-members (and perhaps visit more frequently), 
and thus customers of  these services can provide good value to 
the restaurant. The fact remains, however, that the restaurants 
are not sharing in the value of  their reservations. 
Not surprisingly, this approach has been quite controversial 
within the restaurant industry.13 We note, for example, that the 
extremely busy restaurants at Walt Disney World have become 
targets of  the paid reservations trend. A number of  companies 
have sprung up (including Disney Dining Buddy, Disney Dining 
Scout, WDW Table Finder, and DiS Dining Agent) that charge 
customers between $1 and $15 for hard-to-get Disney World 
restaurant reservations.14 Disney World generally frowns on this 
practice, and some sites have been forced to shut down.15 
13 Lora Kolodny (2014), “Table8 Helps Diners Get Last-Minute Reser-
vations at Booked Restaurants,” Wall Street Journal, Venture Capital Dispatch. 
5/6/14.Viewed 7/4/15 (blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/05/06/table8-
helps-diners-get-last-minute-reservations-at-booked-restaurants/); Christine 
Lagoria-Chafkin (2015). “Hot Seats: The Cutthroat New Ecosystem for Res-
taurant Reservations,” Inc.com. 2/13/15. Viewed 7/15/15. (www.inc.com/
christine-lagorio/new-startup-restaurant-reservation-ecosystem.html).
14 Sandra Pedicini (2015). “Can’t Book a Disney Dining Reservations? 
Websites offer help, for Price,” Orlando Sentinel, 9/8/15. Viewed 10/11/15 
(www.orlandosentinel.com/business/tourism/os-disney-dining-reservations-
scalping-20150908-story.html).
15 Brenna Houck (2015), “Disney World is Cracking Down on 
Third-Party Restaurant Reservation Services,” Eater.com. 9/26/15. Viewed 
10/11/15 (www.eater.com/2015/9/26/9401849/disney-world-restaurant-
reservation-disney-dining-buddy).
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Theoretical Bases of   
Revenue Management Fairness
As we have indicated above, the heart of  this issue is whether 
consumers consider restaurant revenue management practices, 
and particularly reservations fees, to be fair.19 Defined as whether 
consumers view an outcome or the transaction process as reason-
able, acceptable, and just,  perceived fairness has been shown to 
be directly related to customer satisfaction and intent to return 
to a business.20 As we discuss next, the factors that can affect 
perceived fairness include customer familiarity with the practice 
and the perceived motive for charging an additional fee. 
Perceived Fairness Frameworks
Two conceptual comparative frameworks widely used to explain 
fairness perceptions are the principle of  dual entitlement, and 
the concepts of  reference price and reference transaction. The 
principle of  dual entitlement states that most customers believe 
that they are entitled to a reasonable price and the firm is entitled 
to a reasonable profit.21 In this view, an increase in price is 
considered to be fair if  it is due to a cost increase (or similar fac-
tor), but considered unfair if  the price rises without any increase 
in cost or value. Given that there are no added costs associated 
with reservations fees, arbitrarily imposing such a fee may violate 
customers’ beliefs about dual entitlement and cause them to view 
reservations fees as being unfair.
Reference transactions and reference prices. A refer-
ence transaction is how a customer thinks a transaction should 
be conducted, while a reference price is defined as how much a 
customer thinks the service should cost. 22 Logically, the refer-
19 For a review of  the literature on customer responses to RM prac-
tices, see: Sheryl E. Kimes and Jochen Wirtz (2015), “Revenue Management: 
Advanced Strategies and Tools to Enhance Firm Profitability,” Foundations and 
Trends in Marketing. 8(1): 1-68; Jochen Wirtz, Sheryl E. Kimes, Jeannette Ho 
Pheng Theng, and Paul Patterson (2003), “Revenue Management: Resolving 
Potential Customer Conflicts,” Journal of  Revenue and Pricing Management. 2(3): 
216-228; and Sheryl E. Kimes and Jochen Wirtz (2002), “Perceived Fairness of  
Demand-Based Pricing for Restaurants,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration 
Quarterly. 43 (1): 31-37.
20 For example, please see: Lisa E. Bolton, Luk Warlop, and Joseph W. 
Alba (2003), “Consumer Perceptions of  Price (Un)Fairness,” Journal of  Consumer 
Research. March. 29(4): 474-492; and Lan Xia, Kent B. Monroe, and Jennifer L. 
Cox (2004), “The Price Is Unfair! A Conceptual Framework of  Price Fairness 
Perceptions,” Journal of  Marketing. 68: 1-15.
21 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler 
(1986a),“Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” 
American Economic Review. 76: 728-741; and Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, 
and Richard H. Thaler (1986b), “Fairness and the Assumptions of  Economics,” 
Journal of  Business. 59(4): 285-300.
22 Kahneman et al., 1986b; Lan et al., op.cit.; Sheryl Kimes and Jochen 
Wirtz (2003), “Has Revenue Management Become Acceptable? Findings from 
an International Study on the Perceived Fairness of  Rate Fences,” Journal of  
Service Research. 6 (2): 125-135; and Jochen Wirtz and Sheryl E. Kimes (2007), 
“The Moderating Effects of  Familiarity on the Perceived Fairness of  Revenue 
Management Pricing,” Journal of  Service Research. 9(3): 229-240.
ence transaction for restaurant reservations would be that they 
are available without fee, and the reference price would be 
zero. Under this assumption, it would be logical to find that 
consumers view having to pay for a restaurant reservation as 
violating both their reference transaction and their reference 
price. 
Familiarity
Inherent in the concept of  reference transactions and refer-
ence prices is the level of  familiarity that customers have of  a 
particular practice. If  they are familiar with a practice, they 
are more likely to view it as normal. However, they still may 
not see it as just and appropriate.23 Because acceptance tends 
to grow with familiarity, reference prices and transactions may 
change over time as customers become more familiar with 
various pricing practices.
As customers’ familiarity grows, the unfairness percep-
tions of  pricing practices tend to decline. 24 We see this in the 
hotel industry, for example. A 1994 study found that RM pric-
ing practices were considered more acceptable for airlines than 
for hotels.25 In a follow-up study just eight years later, there 
were no longer significant differences between the acceptabil-
ity of  those practices in the two industries.26 This was most 
probably due to the increased prevalence of  RM in the hotel 
industry. By comparison, airline passengers have had many 
years to become accustomed to airline fare changes, which 
were introduced by American Airlines in 1977.27
In the context of  this study, these findings suggest that 
customers who are unfamiliar with reservations fees would be 
more likely to view them as unfair, but customers who are fa-
miliar with such fees would be less likely to view them as unfair.
Inferred Motive
Customers tend to make inferences about a firm’s motive for 
increasing a price or imposing additional fees.28 If  customers 
feel that a company intends to take advantage of  them, they 
are more likely to believe that the firm is behaving in an unfair 
fashion. On the other hand, if  they believe that a company 
does not intend to take advantage of  them, they are more 
23 Kahneman et al. (1986a, 1986b), op. cit.
24 Ibid.
25 Sheryl E. Kimes and Breffni M. Noone (2002), “Perceived Fairness 
of  Yield Management: An Update,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration 
Quarterly. 43(1): 28-29.
26 Ibid.
27 L.J. Davis, “And Now, Can Bob Crandall Have It All?,” New York 
Times Magazine, September 23, 1990 (www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/maga-
zine/and-now-can-bob-crandall-have-it-all.html?pagewanted=all).
28 Margaret C. Campbell (1999). “Perceptions of  Price Unfairness: 
Antecedents and Consequences,” Journal of  Marketing Research. 36(2): 187-199.
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likely to believe that the firm is behaving fairly.29 As with accep-
tance of  a practice, the negative perception that a reservations 
company or restaurant is just trying to make extra revenue and 
take advantage of  the guest should diminish as a guest becomes 
more familiar with reservations fees.
Empirical Survey
To examine consumer responses to various ways to unbundle 
the reservation from the core service, we examined customer 
reaction to the following three scenarios. Scenario 1: the reserva-
tions company charges for a reservation, but does not share the 
revenue with the restaurant; Scenario 2: the reservations company 
charges for a reservation and shares with the restaurant; and 
Scenario 3: the restaurant charges a reservation fee without in-
tervention by a third party. Based on popular press articles and 
blogs, it seems that customers could have a negative reaction to 
reservation fees, but it also seems possible that certain customer 
segments may view them as desirable because they make tables 
available in hard-to-book restaurants. The intent of  this study is 
to provide non-anecdotal insight into this issue. 
Method
In November 2015 we used Amazon Mechanical Turk to 
conduct a survey of  U.S. residents over the age of  18 who had 
gone to a restaurant that takes reservations at least once in the 
previous year.30 Respondents were randomly assigned to read 
one of  the three scenarios and respond to a series of  questions 
about their familiarity with the practice, the perceived unfair-
ness of  the situation and the pricing practice, their inference 
regarding the motive, and their satisfaction level and willing-
ness to return to the hypothetical restaurant. The scenarios are 
shown in Exhibit 1.
We received a total of  297 completed surveys. Respondents’ 
average age was about 36, and they were about evenly divided 
on gender. However, age and gender had no noticeable effect on 
the response. 31 All respondents were familiar with restaurant 
reservations.
29 Margaret C. Campbell (2007). “ ‘Says Who?!’ How the Source of  
Price Information and Affect Influence Perceived Price (Un)fairness,” Jo urnal 
of  Marketing Research: 44(2): 261-271.
30 The survey was limited to respondents living in the U.S. Atten-
tion measures and validity checks were used to ensure that the respondents 
had read the questions. Research has shown that data obtained Amazon 
Mechanical Turk samples are equivalent to that obtained from other sampling 
methods. See: Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang, and Samuel D. Gosling 
(2011), “Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of  Inexpensive, Yet High-
Quality, Data?,” Perspectives of  Psychological Science, 6 (1): 3 – 5; and Connor 
Huff and Dustin Tingley (2015), “ ‘Who Are These People?’ Evaluating the 
Demographic Preferences of  MTurk Survey Respondents,” Research and Politics. 
July-September: 1–12.
31 Because a separate ANCOVA controlling for age and gender showed 
no significant effects, we dropped those variables from further analysis.
Exhibit 1
Three test scenarios
Scenario 1: Reservation Company Does Not Share with Restaurant
You really want to go to a very popular restaurant, but 
realize that it’s very difficult to get a reservation at it. 
While searching online, you come across a company that 
can get you a reservation on the date and time you want 
for $30. The $30 is not shared with the restaurant. 
 
After thinking about this for a while, you realize that you 
really want to go to this restaurant and decide to make 
the reservation and pay the $30.
Scenario 2: Reservation Company Shares with Restaurant
You really want to go to a very popular restaurant, but 
realize that it’s very difficult to get a reservation at it. 
While searching online, you come across a company that 
can get you a reservation on the date and time you want 
for $30. The $30 is shared with the restaurant.
 
After thinking about this for a while, you realize that you 
really want to go to this restaurant and decide to make 
the reservation and pay the $30.
Scenario 3: Restaurant Charges for Reservation
You really want to go to a very popular restaurant, but 
realize that it’s very difficult to get a reservation at it. 
While looking at the restaurant’s website, you notice that 
can get you a reservation on the date and time you want 
for $30. 
 
After thinking about this for a while, you realize that you 
really want to go to this restaurant and decide to make 
the reservation and pay the $30.
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Measures. Using a seven-point rating scale, we measured 
perceived fairness.32 familiarity, inferred motive,33 and satisfac-
32 Campbell (1999), (2007), op.cit.; Peter R. Drake and Darren W. Dahl 
(2003). “Fairness and Discounts: The Subjective Value of  a Bargain,” Journal 
of  Consumer Psychology.13 (3):328-338; and Xia and Monroe (2004), op. cit.
33 Campbell (2007), op. cit.
tion. All scale items, together with their means, standard devia-
tions, and Cronbach alphas are shown in Exhibit 2. 
Results: The Familiarity Effect
We used ANOVA to test for the impact of  the scenario, famil-
iarity with paid restaurant reservations, and the interaction be-
tween scenario and familiarity for each of  the seven constructs. 
Exhibit 2
Measurement items and reliability
Construct Variable  Mean S.D.
Cronbach’s 
Alpha
Familiarity
I am familiar with this pricing practice 2.97 1.76
0.83
This pricing practice is usual 3.39 1.83
This pricing practice is typical 3.01 1.66
This pricing practice seems rather unusual (reverse) 2.89 1.69
Reservations 
Company’s 
Inferred Motive
Bad intentions–Good intentions 3.67 1.64
0.94Intention to take advantage of customers—No intention to take advantage of customers
3.09 1.73
Intention to exploit customers—No intention to exploit customers 3.06 1.71
Restaurant’s 
Inferred Motive
Bad intentions–Good intentions 3.52 1.69
0.95Intention to take advantage of customers—No intention to take advantage of customers
3.04 1.77
Intention to exploit customers–No intention to exploit customers 3.09 1.80
Scenario Fairness
Unfair–Fair 3.52 1.86
0.97Unacceptable—Acceptable 3.53 1.87
Unreasonable—Reasonable 3.38 1.85
Reservations 
Company Fairness 
Unfair–Fair 3.35 1.81
0.98Unacceptable—Acceptable 3.42 1.85
Unreasonable—Reasonable 3.38 1.85
Restaurant 
Fairness
Unfair–Fair 3.05 1.80
0.97Unacceptable—Acceptable 3.05 1.81
Unreasonable—Reasonable 3.00 1.82
Scenario 
Satisfaction
Dissatisfied—Satisfied 3.41 1.87
0.98
Unhappy—Happy 3.35 1.85
Displeased—Pleased 3.33 1.87
Disappointed—Delighted 3.33 1.80
Scenario Intent to 
Return
I would go to this restaurant again in the future 3.77 1.67
0.97
If someone asked me, I would say that it’s likely that I’d go to the 
restaurant again.
3.82 1.78
I will tell my friends to go to this restaurant 3.58 1.72
I will recommend this restaurant to other people 3.57 1.74
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so that we could assess the impact familiarity has on fairness 
perceptions. In general, we found a similar effect in each case. 
That is, the size of  the unfamiliar group pulled down the overall 
ratings, but the smaller familiar group generally accepted the 
unbundling scenarios.
Perceived Fairness
We asked respondents to evaluate both the fairness of  the situ-
ation (the reference transaction) and the fairness of  the pricing 
practice (the reference price), with the following results.
Fairness of  situation. As we indicated, the overall 
ratings indicated that all three scenarios were seen as unfair to 
various degrees (Scenario 1, 3.47; Scenario 2, 3.93; Scenario 
3, 3.03). However, the previous pattern held when the familiar 
respondents’ ratings were broken out. Respondents who were 
familiar with reservations fees considered each situation to be 
fair (Scenario 1, 4.99; Scenario 2, 5.21; Scenario 3, 5.33), while 
unfamiliar respondents rated the situations as unfair (Scenario 1, 
3.00; Scenario 2, 3.51; Scenario 3, 2.69). 
Fairness of  pricing practice. Because of  the differ-
ences in the scenarios, respondents assigned to Scenario 1 were 
asked to indicate their perceptions of  the pricing practices of  
the reservations company only, respondents assigned to Scenario 
2 were asked to evaluate the pricing practices of  both the 
reservations company and the restaurant, and respondents as-
signed to Scenario 3 were asked to evaluate only the restaurant’s 
pricing practice.
Reservations company. Once again, the overall rating 
for the reservations company’s pricing practices was below 4, or 
unfair (Scenario 1, 3.17; Scenario 2, 3.38). Respondents who 
were familiar with paying for reservations had a moderately 
positive view of  the company’s practice of  selling the reserva-
tion, however, whether the firm kept the proceeds (4.88) or 
shared with the restaurant (4.91). Respondents not familiar with 
Exhibit 3
Means by construct and familiarity level
Reservation company 
does not share
Reservation 
company shares Restaurant charges
Familiarity Level Low High Overall Low High Overall Low High Overall
Inferred Motive: Reservations Company 2.56 4.29 2.97 3.14 4.83 3.56
Inferred Motive: Restaurant 3.09 4.97 3.56 2.51 5.31 2.87
Fairness of the Situation 3.00 4.99 3.47 3.51 5.21 3.93 2.69 5.33 3.03
Fairness of the Reservations Company 2.63 4.88 3.17 3.15 4.91 3.38
Fairness of the Restaurant 2.93 4.85 3.41 2.33 4.87 2.63
Satisfaction with the Situation 3.00 5.12 3.51 3.14 5.39 3.70 2.52 5.29 2.87
Intent to Return 3.68 5.07 4.02 3.41 5.23 3.86 2.87 5.23 3.19
 Note: All mean differences for low and high familiarity are significant at p < 0.001. See Exhibit 4 for a formal test of means differences.
Exhibit 4
ANOVA results (significance levels)
Construct Familiarity 
Level
Scenario Familiarity 
x Scenario
Inferred Motive: 
Reservations Company
.000 .017 .921
Inferred Motive: 
Restaurant
.000 .640 .081
Fairness of the 
Situation
.000 .303 .285
Fairness of the 
Reservations Company
.000 .296 .338
Fairness of the 
Restaurant
.000 .309 .279
Satisfaction with the 
Situation
.000 .373 .573
Intent to Return .000 .543 .172
We used the midpoint of  our scale (4 out of  7) as the dividing 
line for respondents who were familiar and those who were un-
familiar with paying for reservations and for acceptance of  the 
practice. All differences presented are significant at the p < 0.05 
level. The summary statistics and the results of  our analysis are 
shown in Exhibits 3, 4, and 5.
Familiarity. The overall average rating showed that the 
respondents as a group were unfamiliar with paid restaurant 
reservations (3.07/7). However, when we split the respondents 
into two groups (again using a rating of  4 as the dividing line), 
we discovered a small group who expressed higher familiarity. 
Because these 61 respondents gave a familiarity rating greater 
than 4 on our 7-point scale, we compared their fairness rating 
of  the three scenarios to that of  the remaining 236 respondents, 
Cornell Hospitality Report • April  2016 • www.chr.cornell.edu • Vol. 16, No. 8 11
reservation purchases rated the practice low in both scenarios 
(Scenario 1, 2.63; Scenario 2, 3.15). 
Restaurant. The restaurant was also viewed as acting 
unfairly by the respondents unfamiliar with reservation sales 
(Scenario 2, 2.93; Scenario 3, 2.33), in contrast to the group of  
familiar respondents, who viewed the restaurant’s actions as be-
ing reasonably fair (Scenario 2, 4.85; Scenario 3, 4.87). 
Inferred Motive
The negative ratings of  unfamiliar respondents carried over 
into a dim view of  the inferred motives of  both the restaurant 
and the reservations company (Scenario 1, 2.56, Scenario 2, 
3.14). However, the familiar respondents’ relatively positive view 
of  the company’s motives (Scenario 1, 4.29, Scenario 2, 4.83) 
partially offset the negatives in the overall ratings. Even so, the 
overall rating of  the reservations company’s motive remained 
negative, especially when the firm kept all proceeds (Scenario 1, 
2.97; Scenario 2, 3.56). 
Similar results were found for the inferred motive of  the 
restaurant. The overall respondents’ rating showed a neutral 
to negative view of  the restaurant’s motive (Scenario 2, 3.56, 
Scenario 3, 2.87). These weak ratings were again weighted by 
the unfamiliar respondents, who offered a low opinion of  the 
restaurant’s motive (Scenario 2, 3.09, Scenario 3, 2.51), even 
though familiar respondents had a positive view (Scenario 2: 
4.97, Scenario 3: 5.31).
Satisfaction
The results for satisfaction also showed the weight of  the large 
group of  unfamiliar respondents. The overall satisfaction rating 
for all three scenarios was negative (Scenario 1, 3.51; Scenario 2, 
3.70; Scenario 3, 2.87). In the split groups, unfamiliar respon-
dents indicated low levels of  satisfaction (Scenario 1, 3.00; 
Scenario 2, 3.14; Scenario 3, 2.52), while familiar respondents 
indicated high satisfaction levels (Scenario 1, 5.07; Scenario 2, 
5.23; Scenario 3, 5.29).
 
Familiarity
Inferred Motive: 
Reservations 
Company
Inferred 
Motive: 
Restaurant
Fairness 
of the 
Situation
Fairness of the 
Reservations 
Company
Fairness of 
the 
Restaurant
Satisfaction 
with the 
Situation
Intent 
to 
Return Scenario***
Familiarity 1
Inferred 
Motive: 
Reservations 
Company
0.59* 1
Inferred 
Motive: 
Restaurant
0.64* 0.81* 1
Fairness of the 
Situation 0.69* 0.64* 0.64* 1
Fairness of the 
Reservations 
Company
0.64* 0.69* 0.57* 0.85* 1
Fairness of the 
Restaurant 0.67* 0.63* 0.75* 0.75* 0.76* 1
Satisfaction 
with the 
Situation
0.66* 0.61* 0.69* 0.73* 0.68* 0.71* 1
Intent to 
Return 0.65* 0.67* 0.66* 0.83* 0.77* 0.68* 0.68* 1
Scenario*** 0.06 0.17** -0.08 -0.03 0.18** -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 1
Exhibit 5
Correlation table
 Notes: * Significant at p < 0.001; ** Significant at p < 0.05; ***Scenario is coded as a continuous variable (1 = Scenario 1, Reservations company does not 
share; 2 = Scenario 2, Reservations company shares with the restaurant; and 3 = Scenario 3, Restaurant charges directly). The higher the number, the 
more revenue the restaurant receives.
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Intent to Return 
Finally, the rating patterns held with regard to likelihood to 
return to the restaurant, with overall ratings ranging from 
neutral to negative depending on the scenario (Scenario 1, 4.02; 
Scenario 2, 3.86; Scenario 3, 3.19). Unfamiliar respondents 
were noticeably unlikely to return (Scenario 1, 3.68; Scenario 2, 
3.41; Scenario 3, 2.87), while familiar respondents were signifi-
cantly more likely to return (Scenario 1, 5.07; Scenario 2, 5.23; 
Scenario 3, 5.23).
Conclusions, Implications, and Further Research
Our key finding is that familiarity is crucial for consumer ac-
ceptance of  the concept of  unbundling restaurant pricing and 
charging for a reservation. Regardless of  the specific approach 
used, we found that consumers who are familiar with reserva-
tions fees were positive toward the practice. They viewed the in-
ferred motive of  the restaurant in a far more positive light, saw 
the transaction as relatively fair, had higher levels of  satisfaction, 
and said they’d be more likely to return to the restaurant. This 
implies that restaurants and reservations companies should do 
all that they can to familiarize consumers with the unbundling 
concept and the idea of  paying for a reservation—particularly 
in prime time. Based on the experience of  hotels and airlines, 
this may take some time. 
One approach might be to show the benefit of  this practice. 
For example, restaurants can let their customers know that it 
may be difficult to get a reservation at certain times on particu-
lar days of  week, but that it is possible to get a reservation for a 
nominal fee through either the restaurant or through a reserva-
tions site. The restaurant can clearly indicate this policy on their 
website, and can also mention it to customers who are unsuc-
cessful with obtaining a reservation for high demand periods. Al-
though this does represent an additional charge, it also provides 
considerable potential value for guests who want a table at a 
particular time but find all tables booked. Thus, restaurants 
can show that they are attempting to meet the requirement of  
offering value for an increased cost, under the principles of  dual 
entitlement and inferred motive.
Our findings have implications for other businesses, includ-
ing taxis, spas, and hairdressers, businesses where the amount 
people will spend is unknown in advance and certain times are 
heavily booked. By unbundling the service from the appoint-
ment, it is possible to separate the cost or price of  a reservation 
or booking from the core service. This is in contrast to the hotel 
and airline industries that essentially bundle the reservation and 
tariff upon booking—a practice that makes sense since the price 
(or the bulk of  guest spending) is established in advance.
Looking ahead. The concept of  unbundling reservations 
from the core service presents a number of  interesting topics 
for future research. It would be interesting to study consumer 
response to variably priced reservations fees (for example, dif-
ferent fees at different times of  day and days of  week). More 
fundamentally, it would be worthwhile to establish the value of  
a reservation. At the moment, since a reservation has no express 
cost, its value may not be part of  a restaurant customer’s calcu-
lation. Yet we know that reservations do have value, especially 
on Friday or Saturday night, when all seats are taken in many 
popular restaurants. In related research, further study of  cus-
tomer response to ticketing systems such as that used with Tock 
could provide good insights into other unbundling methods. 
Finally, it would be interesting to study the spending behavior of  
customers who pay a fee for a reservation. It is possible that their 
price sensitivity is lower and as a result they may spend more per 
person than customers who are unwilling to pay the fee. 
Like all studies, this research has weaknesses. Data come 
from a survey of  a convenience sample of  internet users, so it 
is possible that the results are not representative of  the general 
population. In addition, the survey was only conducted in the 
U.S. and only considered the restaurant industry. It would there-
fore be interesting to conduct similar studies in other countries 
and other industries (perhaps the taxi or spa industries) to estab-
lish the generalizability of  our findings.
Further research on the RM implications and the overall 
economics of  unbundling provide interesting further avenues for 
both theory and practice. Unbundling the reservation from the 
meal experience can give restaurants better control of  their ca-
pacity and manage their revenue since the value of  a reservation 
varies based on day of  week, time of  day and season.  n
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